Static versus Dynamic Verification in Why3, Frama-C and SPARK 2014 by Kosmatov, Nikolai et al.
Static versus Dynamic Verification in Why3, Frama-C
and SPARK 2014
Nikolai Kosmatov, Claude Marche´, Yannick Moy, Julien Signoles
To cite this version:
Nikolai Kosmatov, Claude Marche´, Yannick Moy, Julien Signoles. Static versus Dynamic Ver-
ification in Why3, Frama-C and SPARK 2014. 7th International Symposium on Leveraging




Submitted on 11 Jul 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Static versus Dynamic Verification in
Why3, Frama-C and SPARK 2014?
Nikolai Kosmatov1, Claude Marché2,3, Yannick Moy4, and Julien Signoles1
1 CEA, LIST, Software Reliability Laboratory, PC 174, F-91191 Gif-sur-Yvette
2 Inria, Université Paris-Saclay, F-91893 Palaiseau
3 LRI, CNRS & Univ. Paris-Sud, F-91405 Orsay
4 AdaCore, F-75009 Paris
Abstract. Why3 is an environment for static verification, generic in the sense
that it is used as an intermediate tool by different front-ends for the verification
of Java, C or Ada programs. Yet, the choices made when designing the specifi-
cation languages provided by those front-ends differ significantly, in particular
with respect to the executability of specifications. We review these differences
and the issues that result from these choices. We emphasize the specific feature
of ghost code which turns out to be extremely useful for both static and dynamic
verification. We also present techniques, combining static and dynamic features,
that help users understand why static verification fails.
1 Introduction
Why3 (http://why3.lri.fr) is an environment for deductive program verification,
providing a rich language for specification and programming, called WhyML. The
specification part of WhyML serves as a common format for theorem proving prob-
lems, suitable for multiple provers. The Why3 tool generates proof obligations from
purely logic lemmas and from programs annotated with specifications, then dispatches
them to multiple provers, including SMT solvers Alt-Ergo, CVC4, Z3; TPTP first-order
provers E, SPASS, Vampire; interactive theorem provers Coq, Isabelle and PVS.
Frama-C (http://frama-c.com) is an extensible platform for source-code analysis
of C software. It features a plug-in architecture [42]: the Frama-C kernel performs syn-
tactic analysis and typing of C code, and then allows the user to continue with different
kinds of analyses, both static ones, e.g. based on theorem proving or abstract interpreta-
tion, or dynamic ones. The Frama-C kernel provides the formal specification language
ACSL [3] for specifying contracts on C functions. Contracts can be written by users,
or generated by plug-ins. Two plug-ins (Jessie and WP) permit deductive verification,
that is, they can check that a given C function respects its ACSL specification, using
theorem proving. Both plug-ins make use of Why3 as intermediate tool.
The SPARK language is a subset of Ada dedicated to real-time embedded software
that requires a high level of safety, security, and reliability. It has been applied for many
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years in on-board aircraft systems, control systems, cryptographic systems, and rail sys-
tems [9]. Ada 2012 is the latest version of the Ada language [1], adding new features for
specifying the behavior of programs, such as subprogram contracts and type invariants.
SPARK 2014 (http://www.spark-2014.org/) is the last major version of SPARK, de-
signed to interpret Ada 2012 contracts [39]. To formally prove a SPARK program cor-
rect, the SPARK 2014 toolset also uses WhyML as an intermediate language, and relies
on Why3’s interface to provers to discharge proof obligations.
Although deductive verification with both SPARK 2014 and Frama-C proceeds
through Why3, the design of their specification languages differ significantly, and they
are also different from Why3’s own specification language. One of the reasons is that
specification languages in Frama-C or SPARK aim at being used for other purposes
than purely deductive verification, in particular they can be used for dynamic verifica-
tion. Run-time assertion checking is the dynamic verification approach originating from
the concept of design-by-contract, as it was implemented first in the Eiffel language [40]
and later in the Java Modeling Language (JML) [35]. In those settings, annotations or
contracts are clauses (pre- and postconditions, loop invariants, assertions) associated
with boolean expressions. The run-time assertion checker inserts some extra code into
the regular program code, that will throw an exception if any of these clauses is vio-
lated during execution. Statically checking the validity of contracts came a bit later in
particular with the ESC-Java [5] tool, and later tools like Spec# [2], Dafny [37], Open-
JML [14]. The issues that arise when trying to combine static and dynamic verification
are quite well known [35] (mainly, how to make them agree on a common semantics),
and studied, in particular regarding the impact on end-users of formal methods [7,8].
In Section 2, we review the different choices made in the design of the specification
languages of Why3, Frama-C and SPARK 2014, and investigate the consequences and
issues arising for the various kinds of analyses. One specific feature that is present
in all of SPARK 2014, ACSL and WhyML is the notion of ghost variables and ghost
code. Ghost code is a versatile way for the user to instrument code, and to exploit this
instrumentation both for static and dynamic verification. Yet, ghost code features in the
three languages above also differ significantly, and we investigate these differences in
Section 3. In the activity of deductive verification, a major issue is to understand why
a proof fails. Frama-C and SPARK 2014 implement different techniques to provide the
user with hints about such a failure, using static or dynamic analysis in various ways.
This aspect is reviewed in Section 4.
2 Design Choices in Specification Languages for Why3 and its
Front-ends
Why3 is a versatile environment for deductive program verification. The WhyML lan-
guage dedicated for specification and programming is mostly a purely functional pro-
gramming language augmented with a notion of mutable variables [23]. Non-aliasing of
mutable data is mandatory and is checked statically. Programs in WhyML are formally
specified by contracts (mainly pre- and postconditions) written in an extended first-
order logic partly detailed below. Verification proceeds by generating Verification Con-
















Fig. 1. Why3 front-ends and back-ends
both automated and interactive, in order to discharge these VCs. WhyML is used as an
intermediate language for verification of SPARK programs as well as C and Java pro-
grams [22] (see Figure 1), and can also be used as a primary programming language (it
can be compiled to OCaml).
2.1 Why3’s Specification Language
Why3’s core logic is a typed first-order logic with equality and built-in integer and
real arithmetic. The user can enrich the logical context of a program’s specification
by designing extra theories defining new types, function symbols and predicates. New
types can be defined e.g. by algebraic data type specification, while function and predi-
cate symbols can be defined, possibly recursively, using pattern-matching on algebraic
arguments. Types and logic symbols can also be declared axiomatically by giving sym-
bol signatures and arbitrary axioms. Why3’s core logic also provides extended features
such as type polymorphism, inductive predicates and some form of higher-order func-
tions [11]. Why3 comes which a pretty rich standard library of theories.
A logic of total functions. The choice of basing Why3’s logic on standard first-order
logic implies that it is a 2-valued logic with only total functions. When new function
symbols are defined recursively, Why3’s kernel statically checks that this recursion is
well-founded, so as to be sure that a total function is defined. However, this raises
issues when a function is defined axiomatically. Consider for example the typical case
of division on real numbers, axiomatized by:
function div real real : real
axiom div_spec: forall x y:real. y 6= 0 → y * div x y = x
Notice first that if we omit the premise y6=0 then the axiomatization would be inconsis-
tent: 0 * div 1 0 = 1 hence 0 = 1. A first issue is thus that nothing prevents the user
from writing inconsistent axioms. A mean to avoid such issues is to ask a prover to try
to derive false from the specification: if it succeeds then for sure there is an inconsis-
tency, but this cannot be a complete check because of undecidability of first-order logic.
Such a smoke detection check can be done on demand in Why3 similarly to other tools
like Dafny. The second issue is underspecification: division by zero is not specified, but
it is some value because all functions are total. It is thus perfectly correct to state the
proposition div 1 0 = div 1 0 and indeed it is a tautology.
In the programming part of WhyML, it is not hard to check for division by zero:
one can specify the division operator in programs as a declared, but not implemented,
procedure as follows:
val division (x y:real) : real
requires { y 6= 0 } (* precondition *)
ensures { result = div x y } (* postcondition *)
In other words, when a division is done in a WhyML program, a check is generated to
ensure that divisor is not null, and if this check succeeds then it is sure that the result of
the procedure is identical to the division specified in the logic.
This choice of a logic with total functions is very good for calling back-end provers
such as SMT solvers or first-order provers, because they implement the very same
choice. However, the issues discussed above are traps that a user more used to exe-
cutable semantics of programs can fall into. These issues are extensively discussed by
Chalin [7] based on experimental studies with practitioners.
Executable features of Why3. Why3’s primary goal is static verification of contracts on
WhyML procedures. Why3 also offers two features for executing programs: it imple-
ments a basic interpreter, and a compiler to OCaml. In both cases, the specifications are
just discarded: there is no way to perform run-time assertion checking in Why3. As a
consequence, the non-executability of logic specifications is not an issue. We discuss
future work related to executability in Section 5.
2.2 The Krakatoa Specification Language
Krakatoa was historically the first front-end added to Why3 (actually to Why [22], the
ancestor of Why3). It was designed in the context of the VerifiCard European project,
aiming to statically check properties of JavaCard source code [27]. The initial goal was
to interpret contracts, added to the Java source code and written in JML [5].
A major feature of JML is that an existing Java method can be called in the clauses
of a contract, provided it has no side-effects. This feature allows the user to design
specific Java code for specifying the rest of the code, and indeed JML comes with a li-
brary of side-effect free Java classes implementing general-purpose structures like sets.
This design choice implies that the specifications are executable, which is natural since
JML was initially designed for run-time assertion checking. The primary tool for static
checking of JML annotations was ESC-Java [5] now superseded by OpenJML [14]. A
consequence of the choice of using pure Java methods in specifications is that ESC-Java
must automatically turn them into logic symbols, which is a highly non-trivial task. In-
deed, if such a Java method has itself a precondition, when should it be checked? Should
the code or the contract of this method be used for specification? What if the method
/*@ predicate Swap{L1,L2}(int a[],
@ integer i, integer j) =
@ \at(a[i],L1) == \at(a[j],L2) &&
@ \at(a[j],L1) == \at(a[i],L2) &&
@ \forall integer k; k != i && k != j ==>
@ \at(a[k],L1) == \at(a[k],L2);
@*/
/*@ inductive Permut{L1,L2}(int a[],
@ integer l, integer h) {
@ case Permut_refl{L}:
@ \forall int a[], integer l h;
@ Permut{L,L}(a, l, h) ;
@ case Permut_sym{L1,L2}:
@ \forall int a[], integer l h;
@ Permut{L1,L2}(a, l, h) ==>
@ Permut{L2,L1}(a, l, h) ;
@ case Permut_trans{L1,L2,L3}:
@ \forall int a[], integer l h;
@ Permut{L1,L2}(a, l, h) &&
@ Permut{L2,L3}(a, l, h) ==>
@ Permut{L1,L3}(a, l, h);
@ case Permut_swap{L1,L2}:
@ \forall int a[], integer l h i j;
@ l <= i < h && l <= j < h &&
@ Swap{L1,L2}(a, i, j) ==>
@ Permut{L1,L2}(a, l, h) ;
@ }
@*/
/*@ predicate Sorted{L}(int a[],
@ integer l, integer h) =
@ \forall integer i j;
@ l <= i <= j < h ==>
@ \at(a[i] <= a[j],L) ;
@*/
/*@ requires t != null &&
@ 0 <= i < t.length &&




void swap(int t[], int i, int j) {
int tmp = t[i]; t[i] = t[j]; t[j] = tmp;
}








void selection_sort(int t[]) {
...
}
Fig. 2. Krakatoa annotation language: illustration of hybrid symbols
is not guaranteed to terminate? When should class invariants be checked? Leavens et
al. [35] extensively discuss static versus dynamic verification for JML.
To avoid the issues of turning Java methods into logic symbols, it was decided
in Krakatoa to forbid the use of Java method calls in specifications and provide ac-
cess to Why’s core logic instead [38]. This decision facilitates static verification, but
removes the ability to execute specifications. It is to be noted however that when de-
signing Krakatoa’s specification language, we introduced the notion of so-called hybrid
logic symbols: these are symbols whose definitions are not purely in the logic world but
depend on the memory heap. Indeed they can even depend on several memory states,
and this facility is made available to users using labels and JML’s \at construct to re-
fer to labels. This is exemplified by the annotated code for sorting an array of integers
shown in Figure 2. The type integer denotes unbounded mathematical integers. The
predicate Permut is defined inductively by four clauses introduced by the keyword case,
and depends on two memory states: Permut{L1,L2}(a,l,h) means that the elements of
array a in memory states L1 and L2 can differ between indices l and h, by a permutation
of elements, and are the same elsewhere. In the postconditions of the contracts, Old is
used for L1 to refer to the pre-state of the method while Here is used for L2 to denote
the post-state. Although the specifications seem quite involved, such a code is statically
checked automatically using SMT solvers.
2.3 ACSL: the ANSI C Specification Language
Historically, the first C front-end of Why came quickly after the Java front-end and
was implemented in the Caduceus tool [21]. There was no largely adopted specification
language for C like JML, so a home-made specification language was designed. It is
mostly reusing the same design choice as Krakatoa’s variation on JML: specifications
may use pure function symbols and not the C functions themselves.
The design of the Frama-C framework [30] started in 2006, aiming at analysis of
C source code using various techniques. An open plug-in architecture was designed
so that a user can choose among different kinds of analyses. Originally, plug-ins were
provided for deductive verification and static verification using abstract interpretation.
The language ACSL [3] was designed for attaching formal contracts to C functions.
This language is also a way for plug-ins to communicate information.
Since the main initial objective of Frama-C was static verification, the ACSL lan-
guage was largely inspired by Caduceus and Krakatoa. In particular, the same choice
of using a first-order logic with total functions was made, the use of unbounded integer
arithmetic was encouraged, and the notion of hybrid predicates showed up too.
Later on, the number of plug-ins available in Frama-C increased a lot, aiming at
many different kinds of analyses and not just static verification (http://frama-c.com/
plugins.html). With the increasing use of Frama-C in industrial applications [30], the
need for dynamic verification approaches showed up. In the following we detail the
design of the E-ACSL variation of ACSL, aiming at run-time verification.
2.4 E-ACSL: Run-time Verification of ACSL Specifications
The E-ACSL plug-in [33] automatically translates a C program with ACSL annotations
into another C program that reports a failure whenever an annotation is violated at run
time. If no annotation is violated, the functional behavior of the new program is exactly
the same as that of the original one. This plug-in thus provides a run-time assertion
checker in the same vein as the one for JML. As such, it provides to the Frama-C en-
vironment the possibility to detect wrong annotations using concrete execution of the
program, that is one way to “debug” specifications. Moreover, an executable specifica-
tion makes it possible to check assertions that cannot be verified statically, and thus to
establish a link between monitoring tools and static analysis tools [34]. An additional
benefit of this plug-in is that it helps in combining some Frama-C analyzers with other
ones that do not natively understand the ACSL specification language.
A major issue is that the initial design of ACSL did not take into account the pos-
sibility of executing specifications. This is why the E-ACSL plug-in only supports a
subset of ACSL called E-ACSL [16,33]. The main features that are excluded are: un-
bounded quantifications, that is quantification on sets that cannot be statically seen as
finite; and logic symbols that are axiomatized. Support of some ACSL clauses is not yet
implemented (namely assigns clauses for frame properties and decreases clauses for
termination properties). However, a significant effort was made to support the following
important features.
Unbounded mathematical integers. These are compiled into C code, using GNU Multi-
Precision library [25] if needed. Moreover, a careful static analysis is performed to
avoid use of GMP’s unbounded integers in many cases, for instance when the result of
an arithmetical operation can still be represented by a machine integer (of the same,
or a longer C type). It was noted that in practice only few uses of GMP integers are
needed in the resulting code [16,28], meaning that supporting unbounded integers does
not induce a significant overhead.
Support for memory-related ACSL constructs. ACSL provides built-in predicates that
allow the user to express properties about the memory, for example that a pointer refers
to a valid memory location [3]. This is supported in E-ACSL thanks to a custom C mem-
ory monitoring library, that tracks memory-related C constructs (malloc and free func-
tions, initialization of variables, etc.) so that the generated instrumented code calls the
monitoring library primitives to store validity and initialization information (whenever a
memory location is allocated, deallocated and assigned), and to extract this information
when evaluating memory-related ACSL constructs. To optimize the performance of the
resulting code and avoid monitoring of irrelevant variables, a preliminary backward
dataflow analysis has been implemented to determine a correct over-approximation
of the set of memory locations that have to be monitored for a given annotated pro-
gram [28,32].
Coping with underspecified logic functions. An annotation may contain underspecified
functions (division by zero, but also access to an invalid pointer, etc.). A design choice
is not to model this kind of undefined behavior, but to report an error instead. Tech-
nically, this is done by relying on the pre-existing Frama-C plug-in RTE dedicated to
generate assertions from potential run-time errors. E-ACSL then translates the gener-
ated assertions as well. In practice, it means that an assertion such as
//@ assert (*p == *p);
although valid in any case in ACSL, will be reported as an error by E-ACSL when p is
not valid, because RTE generates an assertion
//@ assert \valid(p);
This choice to have a different semantics in ACSL and E-ACSL with respect to under-
specified functions follows the general observation by Chalin [7] that an end-user who
writes ACSL annotations typically expects that an error is reported when dereferencing
an invalid pointer in specifications.
2.5 SPARK 2014: Static Verification of Ada 2012 Contracts
Historically, the SPARK toolset, up to version 2005, was using its own specification
language, for static verification only. The new version of Ada in 2012 added a notion
of contracts in the Ada language itself, in a similar fashion as Eiffel contracts: they
can be checked dynamically, as the compiler turns these contracts into executable code.
Then the new version SPARK 2014 was redesigned, in order to use Ada2012 contracts
as specification language, and a new static verification tool GNATprove was designed
using Why3 as intermediate tool for VC generation.
The path followed by SPARK 2014 is thus similar to JML, and the reverse of the
path from ACSL to E-ACSL: a language initially designed for run-time checking had
to be used in static verification. A major objective was to guarantee that the semantics
of the contracts must be the same for both run-time checking and static checking. The
main issues to achieve this objective are as follows.
Capture undefinedness in assertions. Any expression in contracts that may generate an
error at run time (e.g. division by zero) should induce the generation of a verification
condition that proves it is defined. This means that the GNATprove tool must analyze
each expression to collect all possible run-time errors, and generate additional assertions
for them. It is somehow very similar to the RTE plug-in of Frama-C.
Promote program procedures into logic functions. This is the same issue ESC-Java
had to solve in order to handle Java methods in specifications. The solution adopted by
SPARK is to completely forbid side-effects in functions used in specifications. Such a
check is quite easy to perform in the context of SPARK because there are strict coding
rules for an Ada program to be in the SPARK fragment: pointers are forbidden, aliasing
is forbidden, and a dataflow analysis is performed to collect read and write effects.
Also, Ada 2012 has the notion of expression-functions, whose translation into logic
is immediate. In fact, the work on SPARK 2014 was influential in getting expression-
functions into Ada 2012, so that they can be used in static verification.
Providing access to non-executable datatypes. It turns out that for complex specifi-
cations it is important to provide extra datatypes. Datatypes that are often needed are
collections. In SPARK, there is a library of collections that are specifically designed for
simultaneous use in dynamic and static verification [17]. The user can even design her
own library of non-executable datatypes, using the so-called external axiomatizations,
for example to support unbounded integers in proof. Partial support for unbounded inte-
gers is also available by selecting a compilation switch, which ensures that intermediate
computations are performed in arbitrary precision: in SPARK, there is a library for un-
bounded arithmetic that is used for this purpose. When the switch is selected, contracts
with arithmetic computations can be both dynamically checked with this library and
also interpreted as mathematical integers in static verification.
Type invariants. In Ada, dynamic verification of type invariants is partial, for efficiency
reason. It is only done at exit of public procedures of a package, and only for types that
are defined in the same package. the JML run-time assertion checker has similar restric-
tions when checking class invariants. In the SPARK subset of Ada, appropriate restric-
tions on the expressions used in invariants were chosen so that verification of invariants
can be done statically. It is important to notice that non-aliasing restrictions of SPARK
are crucial to be able to check invariants in a sound way. Why3 has a similar notion of
type invariants, and their sound static verification is also possible thanks to non-aliasing
restrictions. On the contrary, there is no Frama-C plug-in today that can statically check
ACSL’s type invariants because of the potential aliasing in C data structures.
2.6 Mixed Static-Dynamic Verification in Frama-C and SPARK 2014
As seen above, both Frama-C and SPARK 2014 have different techniques and tools to
check specifications either statically or dynamically. A natural question that arises is
whether it is safe to mix these various kinds of verification techniques on the same
program. Both Frama-C and SPARK 2014 have tool support to ensure consistency of
verification activities.
The Frama-C kernel is the central core that communicates with all the plug-ins.
When a given plug-in is able to verify that some annotation is valid, it is usually un-
der the assumption that some other annotations are valid. For example, when a static
verification plug-in can prove that a postcondition for a procedure is valid, it is under
the hypothesis that the pre-condition holds. To ensure consistency, the Frama-C ker-
nel attaches to each annotation some information status: it tells which plug-in validates
it, together with the set of other annotations that are assumed by this plug-in [15]. The
graph of dependencies between annotations that are assumed or proved can be displayed
graphically, and it is checked automatically whether every specification has been proved
by at least one plug-in.
Combining static and dynamic verification in SPARK is possible and indeed ex-
pected, including when the program also contains non-SPARK Ada code. SPARK rec-
onciles the logic semantics and executable semantics of contracts, so users can execute
contracts, debug them like code, and test them when formal verification is too difficult
to achieve. Furthermore, by keeping the annotation language the same as the program-
ming language, users don’t have to learn another language. Like Ada has been designed
to integrate smoothly with parts of the application written in C, SPARK has been de-
signed to integrate smoothly with parts of the application written in Ada outside of the
SPARK subset. Hence, a SPARK application may consist of functions in SPARK, Ada
and C being linked together. While formal verification can be applied to the SPARK
part of the application, this is not the case for the Ada part or (unless the user also
uses Frama-C) the C part. Those parts should be verified using traditional verification
techniques based on testing and reviews. The overall verification argument may be com-
posed from individual verification arguments on the SPARK subprograms (using formal
verification) and Ada or C subprograms (using other techniques), based on the subpro-
gram contracts used in formal verification. Indeed, the assumptions made during formal
verification of a subprogram can be verified during testing of another function called by
or calling the first one: preconditions and postconditions can be executed with the very
same semantics that they have in proofs. SPARK 2014 offers a similar mechanism as
Frama-C [29] to check what is proved, by which technique, under which assumptions.
3 Ghost Variables and Ghost Code
A ghost variable is a variable that is added to a given program only for the purpose of
formal specification. This notion is reminiscent from the notion of auxiliary variables in
/*@ requires x >= 0 && y >= 0;
@ ensures \exists integer a,b; a*x+b*y == \result;
@*/
int gcd(int x, int y) {
//@ ghost integer a = 1, b = 0, c = 0, d = 1;
/*@ loop invariant x >= 0 && y >= 0 ;
@ loop invariant a*\at(x,Pre)+b*\at(y,Pre) == x ;
@ loop invariant c*\at(x,Pre)+d*\at(y,Pre) == y ;
@ loop variant y;
@*/
while (y > 0) {
int r = x % y;
//@ ghost integer q = x / y;
x = y; y = r;
//@ ghost integer ta = a, tb = b;




Fig. 3. Ghost code for computing Bézout coefficients
Hoare logic. These variables typically need to be assigned, during the normal execution
of the program: this is done by adding ghost code.
As an illustrative example, consider Euclide’s algorithm to compute the greatest
common divisor d of two integers x and y. One may want to state as a postcondition the
Bézout property: there exist integers a and b such that d = ax+by. A postcondition with
an existential quantification is typically hard to prove by automatic provers. Moreover,
in this particular example, the property itself is a non-trivial mathematical one. It is a
typical example where ghost code can help: in that example, the values of a and b can be
computed during execution of the algorithm itself. A program in C annotated in ACSL
is shown in Figure 3. The ghost variables a, b, c and d store coefficients, modified in
the ghost code of the loop body, so that they keep satisfying Bézout-like properties as
described by the loop invariants.
Another example of ghost code is an alternative way to specify the permutation
property of a sorting algorithm: instead of an inductive predicate as in Figure 2, a sorting
algorithm may return a ghost array, mapping the interval of indexes [0..n− 1] to itself
in a bijective way, expressing the permutation of elements before and after sorting. The
content of this ghost array can be updated with ghost code during the sorting algorithm,
so that it keeps representing the permutation of elements from the initial array to its
current state.
3.1 Ghost Code in Why3
The ability to set a ghost attribute to variable declarations and to arbitrary code is na-
tively part of the WhyML language. The Why3 type system ensures that ghost code
must not interfere with regular code, in the sense that it can be erased without observable
difference in the program outcome. In particular, ghost data is forbidden to participate
in regular computations and ghost code can neither mutate regular data nor diverge [20].
There are numerous and various examples of code that naturally need ghost code for
their formal specification and their proof (http://toccata.lri.fr/gallery/ghost.
en.html).
Lemma functions. Beyond instrumenting the regular code, ghost code is an effective
way to guide the automatic provers in static verification. Ghost code can be used to
prove properties: if one writes a ghost function with a contract of the form




and if this function has no side-effect and is proved terminating (with the decreasing
measure var given by the variant clause), then it is a constructive proof of
∀x1, . . . ,xn,∃result,Pre⇒ Post
In particular, if f is defined recursively, it simulates a proof by induction: the VC gen-
erator effectively generates the cases of an induction scheme. This technique of using
programs to make proofs is nowadays called “auto-active verification” and is available
in several other verification environments [36,44].
Lemma functions are often used in complex programs proved in Why3, for example
to deal with recursive data structures [11] or to reason on semantics [12]. The most
complex case study of static verification using Why3 up to now, a verified first-order
prover [13], makes extensive use of ghost code and lemma functions.
3.2 Static and Dynamic Verification of Ghost Code
Ghost code is not only useful for static verification. It may be executed under some con-
ditions, and thus is equally helpful for run-time verification: it can monitor properties
dynamically. Environments like JML and Spec# have ghost variables and ghost code,
primarily for run-time execution. Dafny also has a notion of lemma functions.
Ghost code in Frama-C. In Frama-C, ghost code is just regular C code located in ACSL
comments. As such, it is naturally possible to use it for static verification [6], and to ex-
ecute it with E-ACSL. However, Frama-C has currently some limitations with respect
to ghost code: unlike what is specified in the ACSL design [3], the current implemen-
tation of Frama-C only allows ghost variables to have a C type, not a logic type like
unbounded integers. This, of course, simplifies execution of ghost code, but limits the
ghost capabilities for static verification. As such, the example of Figure 3 is not accepted
because the ghost variables are declared as integer (unbounded mathematical integers
of ACSL), so to statically check this code one currently needs to turn them into int and
ignore overflow checks. Another current limitation is that the kernel does not check that
ghost code does not interfere with regular code like in Why3. Statically checking this
property is much more difficult in C than in Why3, because C allows arbitrary aliasing
whereas Why3 controls aliasing statically [20].
Ghost code in SPARK 2014. In SPARK, ghost code is declared using an Ada aspect
Ghost on the declaration. In the design of ghost code in SPARK, it was mandatory to be
able to check non-interference of ghost code with regular code. In particular the com-
piler must be able to eliminate ghost code if the user wants to compile a program without
ghost. Unlike the case of Frama-C, SPARK 2014 can statically check, like Why3, the
non-interference of ghost code. This is because SPARK code must follow strong non-
aliasing properties (checked by data-flow analysis) and coding rules (http://docs.
adacore.com/spark2014-docs/html/lrm/subprograms.html#ghost-entities).
As in other systems, ghost variables in SPARK are typically used for keeping inter-
mediate values, keeping memory of previous states, or logging previous events (http:
//docs.adacore.com/spark2014-docs/html/ug/spark_2014.html#ghost-code).
Various uses of ghost are presented in examples of the SPARK manual
(http://www.spark-2014.org/entries/detail/manual-proof-in-spark-2014):
ghost code can be used to encode a state machine (functional properties of the
Tetris game http://blog.adacore.com/tetris-in-spark-on-arm-cortex-m4)
or to model a file system (proving standard Ada Get_Line function http:
//blog.adacore.com/formal-verification-of-legacy-code). Ghost code was
extensively used in high-level specifications of memory allocators [18].
A limitation with respect to ghost code, similar to Frama-C, is the executability of
ghost code in case of use of external axiomatizations: in that case the compiler would
refuse to compile ghost code into run-time checks.
4 Understanding Proof Failures
In static verification, a major issue is understanding the reason why some proof fails.
There are various reasons why it may fail:
1. The property to prove is indeed invalid: the code is not correct with respect to the
given specification.
2. The property is in fact valid, but is not proved, for two possible reasons:
a. The prover is not able to obtain a proof (in the given time and memory limits):
this is the incompleteness of the proof search;
b. The proof may need extra (or stronger) intermediate annotations, such as loop
invariants, or more complete contracts of the subprograms.
For the user to be able to fix the code or the specification of her program, it is essential to
understand into which of the above cases any undischarged VC falls. A general solution
is to generate counterexamples in order to illustrate the issue on concrete values. This
capability exists in different forms in Why3, SPARK 2014 and Frama-C.
4.1 Counterexamples from SMT models
A first solution is to exploit the SMT solvers’ capability of generating models. Indeed,
to discharge a given VC, the SMT solver is given the hypotheses and the negation of the
goal, and it is asked to prove unsatisfiability. In case of failure, the SMT solver provides
a model that can be turned into a counterexample for the initial program. This is how
it is implemented in Why3 and SPARK 2014 [26]. In Frama-C, the Counter-Example
plug-in implements the very same idea [30], but it is still a not-yet-released research
prototype which only supports a few constructs.
There are actually some issues with this approach, which limit its applicability. A
first issue is related to the incompleteness of the solver: in presence of non-linear integer
arithmetic, or arbitrary quantification, the logic is not decidable so the solver may time
out. Second, when a model is generated, it can only lead to a potential counterexample,
and the user still has to understand what should be fixed if it is not a true one. That is
due to the solver’s vision of the program, in which the code of a called function and the
body of a loop are replaced by the corresponding subcontracts: the contract of the callee
and the loop invariant, respectively. Thus, such a counterexample can illustrate either
Reason 1 above (non-compliance between the code and the specification) or Reason 2b
above (the code is in fact compliant to the specification, but the contracts of some callees
or loops are too weak to complete the proof). Run-time checking of the program for
such a counterexample candidate can be used to distinguish these cases.
4.2 Counterexamples from testing
In Frama-C, the StaDy plug-in has been designed to generate counterexamples [41].
Unlike above, the technique does not rely on a counter-model generated by the prover,
it is based on test generation instead. The annotations of the input program are first
transformed into C code similarly to the E-ACSL plug-in. The instrumented code is
then passed to a Dynamic Symbolic Execution (DSE) testing tool that tries to find tests
producing annotation failures. An interesting aspect is that with this approach it is pos-
sible (using two different instrumentation techniques) to distinguish between a non-
compliance (Reason 1 above) and a subcontract weakness (Reason 2b above). Other
potential benefits come from the capacity of DSE to focus on one path at a time, and to
use concrete values when the constraints are too complex for a solver. The main limi-
tation of this approach is related to the combinatorial explosion of the path space to be
explored by the test generation tool. Other related approaches have been reported in the
context of Eiffel [43] and Dafny [10].
All these techniques being relatively recent, more research is required to better eval-
uate and understand their benefits and limitations in practice.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have surveyed, in the context of Why3, Frama-C and SPARK 2014, various cases
where dynamic verification supplement static verification. The first one is related to
verification by testing those parts of the program that are too complex to prove formally,
Why3 Krakatoa Frama-C SPARK
ACSL E-ACSL
Executable contracts no no no yes yes
Only total functions in logic yes yes yes no1 no2
Unbounded integers in logic yes yes yes yes no3
Unbounded quantification yes yes yes no no
Ghost code yes partial4 partial5 partial5 yes
Counterexamples from solvers yes no partial6 partial6 yes
Counterexamples from testing no no no yes7 no
1 Run-time checks for well-definedness are generated.
2 Run-time checks and VCs for well-definedness are generated.
3 See discussion in Section 2.5.
4 Non-interference with regular code is not checked.
5 Only executable C code, and non-interference with regular code is not checked.
6 The dedicated plug-in Counter-Example is not yet publicly available.
7 The test generation tool PathCrawler, underlying StaDy, is currently not publicly available.
Fig. 4. Comparison of features supported by specification languages.
and a safe combination of tests and proofs. We have also discussed the use of ghost code,
essential for formally specifying complex functional behaviors and exploitable by both
static and dynamic approaches. The third case — understanding the reason why a proof
fails — can rely again either on a static method (exploiting the counter-model returned
by an SMT solver) or a dynamic one (applying test generation on a code instrumented
with executable annotations). Figure 4 summarizes the various aspects supported or not
by the considered tools.
We emphasized the role of non-aliasing restrictions in Why3 and SPARK 2014,
which permits to check type invariants in a sound way, and also to statically check the
non-interference of ghost code with regular code. We conclude with a few issues that
are worth investigating further.
Need for executability of pure logic types. We have seen that using unbounded mathe-
matical integers in specifications is natural in static verification, and can be supported
in dynamic verification thanks to the use of libraries implementing unbounded integers.
There are many other logic theories used in static verification (as present e.g. in Why3’s
standard library) and each of them should come with an executable counterpart to be
able to use it dynamically. It should be done in a systematic way, that is, by synthe-
sizing executable code from axiomatization [31]. A particular hard case is that of real
numbers: it is a theory that is quite well supported in automatic provers, but there is no
obvious solution how to provide an executable version of real numbers. Some authors
propose approximation methods for that purpose [19,24].
Need for unbounded quantification. To be executable, quantification in formulas must
necessarily range over finite sets. However, there are examples where specification re-
quires quantification over infinitely many data, for instance, the solution of “patience
game” from the VScomp competition in 2014 (http://toccata.lri.fr/gallery/
patience.en.html) needs quantification over infinitely many sequences. JML and
SPARK languages syntactically impose finite ranges of quantification so that the speci-
fication of this example can simply not be written. On that specific matter, there is still
a gap between static and dynamic verification that needs to be filled.
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